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KAREEM IBRAHIM & DIANE SINGERMAN 
URBAN EGYPT: ON THE ROAD FROM 
REVOLUTION TO THE STATE?
GOVERNANCE, THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT, 
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
ABSTRACT
Three years after the Egyptian revolution, demands for social jus-
tice continue to be articulated but remain largely unfulilled. Many 
of those demands revolve around the need for urban development, 
including more equitable spatial distribution of public services, further 
democratization of planning processes and local government, and 
urban development policies which serve the general public, rather 
than wealthy residents, foreign investors, or real estate speculators. 
Unfortunately, the current urban local administrative system lacks 
representativeness and does not allow for local participation. More 
recently, there have been a growing number of mobilized initiatives 
that are searching for ways to build a more reciprocal relationship 
between urban communities and the state. Yet the government remains 
ambivalent to further democratize local administration and local poli-
tics and increase representation at the local level, and continues to 
design and implement plans that do not address the urban challenges 
affecting the daily lives of millions of Egyptians. 
Building on the work of “TADAMUN: The Cairo Urban Solidarity 
Initiative,” and in light of global experiences in participatory local 
governance, this article argues that reforming local government 
through institutionalizing communication channels between citizens 
and the state and broadening their engagement through coalitions, 
creating new channels for government accountability and responsi-
veness, and providing more equitable services, may help meet the 
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demands for social injustice generated by the 2011 Revolution and 
consolidate the democratic process in Egypt.
KEYWORDS:
Egypt, participatory governance, decentralization, urban develop-
ment, local politics
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T 
he post-revolutionary era is nearing its third anniversary. 
Popular mobilization and protests continue to emerge 
in new political spaces and in new forms. Protest has 
become ordinary and while some political forces are re-
imagining themselves and maintaining their legitimacy and popularity, 
others are fading away or suffering from renewed government repression.
Over the past three years there have been many controversial 
changes at the national political level. Yet, at a more local level, newly 
mobilized initiatives have searched for ways to build a more reciprocal 
relationship between urban communities and the state and its ministries, 
broadening their support and capabilities in the process. The demand 
for social justice over the last three years has also been articulated in a 
way to draw new attention to the problems of urban Egypt, including 
demands for a more equitable spatial distribution of public services, 
further democratization of planning processes and local government, 
and urban development policies which serve the general public, rather 
than wealthy residents, foreign investors, or real estate speculators. 
Not surprisingly perhaps, despite the widely declared demands of 
the 2011 Revolution, there remains deep government ambivalence 
to further democratize local administration and local politics and 
increase representation at the local level. We argue that this remains an 
impediment to normalizing and democratizing state-society relations.
THE REVOLUTIONARY MOMENT
Immediately preceding and during the January 2011 Egyptian 
Revolution, Cairo and other parts of the country experienced massive 
protest and collective resistance which had evolved out of pre-
revolutionary protest from a variety of organizations and groups. The 
strength of local communities was demonstrated by the rapid and 
impressive formation of Ligan Cha’biyya (or neighborhood committees) 
as police and security forces withdrew from the city on January 28, 
2011 following violent police repression. 
After the fall of the Mubarak regime on February 11, newly mobilized 
groups and initiatives realized that they needed to remain active and 
increase their strength to realize the main goals of the Revolution: 
freedom, dignity, and social justice. In fact, some of the new initiatives 
understood that in order to survive and contest the ‘remnants’ and 
powers of the old regime they needed to institutionalize themselves to 
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address other problems, as dificult as that has proven to manage. 
Other groups continued to stage public political protests, hoping 
to inluence the direction and composition of the new government, 
yet distancing themselves from state engagement, fearing they would 
be tainted or corrupted by power. After any regime change, some 
groups succeed in negotiating the move beyond mobilization to 
institutionalize their demands by engaging with a state, forcing it to 
change its authoritarian cast. Other initiatives lose their popularity 
and simply fade away, or fail in their concerted attempts to reform the 
state (of course, there is great diversity in these paths). The challenge 
of transforming the Egyptian state remains almost as dificult as it was 
before the 2011 uprising.
IMPLEMENTING THE REVOLUTION: IMMEDIATE DEMANDS 
AND INITIATIVES
Social justice was one of the major frames of the Revolution and it 
continues to motivate protest and collective action, particularly since 
economic conditions have worsened. Revolutionaries, civil society 
groups, and new political parties articulate an agenda around social 
justice as they demand bread (or more abstractly, an adequate standard 
of living), the equitable and eficient delivery and provision of public 
services and stronger labor rights.
Revolutionary strategies and contestation during the past two years 
has included protests and sit-ins, litigation to realize civil, political, 
and land rights (Kazeboon), and Do-it-Yourself Governance (such 
as communities building their own on/off ramps to the Ring Road, 
appropriating open land for diverse purposes). Activists have also 
used social media to monitor public services and demand greater 
local government accountability (‘Ayziin Ne’yish/We Want to Live), 
organizing nonpayment movements as well (Mish Dafa’yiin/We Won’t 
Pay) out of frustration over failures in public service delivery. Other 
initiatives have organized public spectacles to shame government 
oficials for their ineptitude such as throwing garbage over the gates of 
Governorate or Ministry ofices. 
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THE POST JANUARY 2011 REGIMES: TWO PATHS TO CHANGE
As a consequence of the Revolution generally fair elections were 
held, two rounds of constitutional reforms were launched, and a plethora 
of new political parties, new leaders, and new groups emerged. At the 
time, there were two different paths to political change articulated by 
various actors in Egypt. The irst path included strategies to reform the 
state (including how the state proposes to reform itself) and priorities for 
constitutional and electoral reform. The second path coalesced around 
local community initiatives which deployed strategies to address 
immediate needs through political protest, revolutionary initiatives, 
and legal activism. Yet both these paths shared a surprising disinterest 
in transforming local government and local politics and democratizing 
it further. Without local government reforms, this article argues, broader 
citizen engagement and demands for government accountability and 
responsiveness and more equitable service provision will fall far short of 
expectations generated by the 2011 Revolution. Our analysis emerges 
out of the work of “TADAMUN: The Cairo Urban Solidarity Initiative” 
which has been working since 2011 to promote the idea that all citizens 
have an equal right to their city, as well as a shared responsibility 
towards it. We strive to work with all stakeholders to build alliances 
and coalitions to encourage change and introduce realistic alternatives 
and solutions for existing urban problems via our ield work, policy 
briefs, public seminars and meetings, and public outreach. Rather than 
more undemocratic and elitist decisions, we explore and promote 
new urban policies that are more effective, equitable, participatory, 
and sustainable. Despite the complexity of urban challenges, many 
initiatives, including TADAMUN, are working to forge cooperation 
and solidarity among local residents, activists, government oficials, 
architects, housing rights activists, civil society, local initiatives, and 
planners to address these critical issues (see www.tadamun.info for 
more information about our project and its activities). If this agenda 
seems naïve or unrealistic, simply ignoring the root problems of our 
cities and governance failures, is not an option either. 
The First Path: Attempts to Reform the State 
Despite public crises over the provision of public services (water, 
petrol, and electricity shortages) that emerged during the irst two years 
of the Revolution, the elected government of President Mohamed 
Morsi tried to shift responsibility for public services to the people and 
promoted austerity and rationing. For example, one of the irst major 
initiatives of President Morsi’s government was “Watan Nazif” or “A 
Clean Homeland” and citizens were asked to sweep the streets of the 
accumulated garbage. The Morsi government did not take responsibility 
for the garbage problem or force internal and bureaucratic changes 
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to solve it. In its rhetoric, the Morsi government argued that the 
solution to state reform was greater eficiency, better management, and 
ethical integrity. It should have engaged the zabaleen (a longstanding 
community of refuse collectors who reside in Manshiet Nasr and 
who recycle the garbage), privately-contracted companies, and other 
stakeholders in the waste sector, particularly within the state, to serve 
the public interest, rather than blame citizens for the garbage in the 
streets (see Fahmy and Sutton 2010; Furniss 2012). 
It is important to note that pre-revolutionary planning paradigms 
were still intact despite the fervor of revolutionary frames and dreams 
for a new government led by the Freedom and Justice Party (see 
Singerman 2009). The Morsi government continued the Mubarak policy 
of building additional new cities in the desert, separating communities 
from employment options and their social ties, and further segregating 
the city along class lines. For example, in May 2013, the Minister of 
Housing declared a plan to build 44 new cities all over Egypt between 
2013 and 2052. This endeavor was supposed to commence immediately 
with the construction of al-Fairuz City in Port Said, and the New Alamain 
City on the North Coast (Nagila 2013). Morsi’s housing initiatives were 
designed to be somewhat more affordable, but he continued using 
public funds to create even more isolated, unpopular new cities rather 
than devising more creative and sustainable policies of furthering in 
situ development of Cairo’s informal areas so that people could remain 
near their jobs, families, and social networks. 
The Second Path to Change: Local Community Initiatives
The second path to change relies upon community activism to 
further social justice and address immediate local needs. This path 
utilizes political protest, mobilization, and legal activism and presents 
new narratives and terminologies to the public. Such entities as 
Ligan Cha’biyya (Popular Committees) and ‘I’tilafaat Shabbab (Youth 
Coalitions) were all products of revolutionary mobilization when 
people started to explore the boundaries of collective action during 
the government’s absence and security vacuum. What started in the 
beginning as an effort to protect local neighborhoods and streets during 
a political and security crisis as the revolution unfolded in early 2011 
grew into collective efforts to provide community services (Bremer 
2011). This role developed even further where some community 
groups started making claims on the government and monitoring the 
government’s provision of public services. 
There were successful examples of this way of engaging with the 
State – the most obvious one being the Revolution itself – and some 
demands were achieved after prolonged contestation. However, this 
type of activism has not changed the state itself nor forced the state 
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and its leadership to enhance social justice in regard to the built 
environment at various scales. Unfortunately, and not surprisingly, the 
power of these new local initiatives was often ephemeral since they 
were voluntaristic, unrepresentative, and poorly or irregularly funded.
Nevertheless, there are many example of such community activism: 
a group of activists managed to stop and reverse demolition decrees 
issued by the Prime Minster for two architecturally signiicant buildings 
through contestation, sit-ins, and use of social media in Alexandria. 
In Boulaq Abul-Ela and Boulaq al-Dakrour the Ligan Cha’biyya acted 
in place of the dissolved elected Local Councils and monitored the 
provision of public services in their neighborhoods through agreements 
with both Cairo and Giza Governorates. In a densely populated area 
of Muhandasiin – Mit ‘Uqba – the popular committee negotiated with 
the local district authorities to realize a long-stalled expansion of 
natural gas lines to the community and the repaving of its alleyways 
in a much more cost effective manner. They were able to play such 
a role by accessing detailed information about the cost of labor and 
materials for the paving project in the more open political climate after 
2011, although they had to struggle to convince the local authorities 
to work with them and not in isolation from the community. They also 
contributed labor to the project, monitored it, and were able to lower 
the project’s costs so that they were able to extend the street paving 
from two small streets, to nine (see TADAMUN 2013).
Such initiatives “claimed” political space and engaged with the 
state during a moment of political lux to achieve short-term goals and 
resolve issues related to their communities or their direct interests. 
However, in the long run there are no guarantees that such claimed 
political space will survive.
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Photo 1: Members of the Meet Oqba Popular Committee for the Defense of 
the Revolution lay paving stones in their streets after the installation of a new 
gas line. The Popular Committee lobbied the Giza Governorate successfully 
to improve the neighborhood’s gas infrastructure and to adopt a community-
based plan to pave the roads. Community volunteers provided labor support 
and monitored the contractors. Photo Credit: TADAMUN/Salma Belal.
TRANSITIONS AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
REVOLUTIONARY GOALS: TARGETING AND ENGAGING 
THE STATE
Local initiatives face a challenge about how to generate functional 
synergies between institution-building and mobilization. The challenge 
facing activists is how to move beyond protest to institutionalizing 
power. How can the state and its institutions as well as local bodies be 
transformed to embody revolutionary ideals?
Not surprisingly, in 2013 both during the Morsi government and 
after it was deposed, revolutionaries and their activism were pushed 
aside by the reconsolidated state and political parties who were 
anxious to protect their newly-won power and consolidate their 
political base. “Claimed” political space of protest and demonstrations 
is disappearing and the government and communities may soon 
question the “representativeness” of local initiatives if they do not 
institutionalize themselves further. The question which faces many of 
these groups is whether their priorities should continue to focus on 
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direct community needs, or whether they should, in parallel, demand 
more state recognition and institutionalized, legal representation? 
Unfortunately, the current urban local administrative system is 
impermeable to input from outside the governmental apparatus (i.e. little 
local participation and public outreach, public hearings, community 
vetting or approval of local government policy). In these circumstances, 
it is very dificult for a local initiative to force or persuade the government 
to listen to them. Can anyone under the current institutional framework 
really have a voice in governmental development plans? Shortly after 
the Revolution, local municipal people’s councils were disbanded 
and thus it is only the executive councils at the local level who are 
managing local affairs, with little oficial citizen participation (See 
TADAMUN 2013b for more information about the limitations of local 
administration in Egypt). At the same time, even if the long-promised 
municipal elections are held after the upcoming Presidential and 
Parliamentary elections in 2014, will their members be able to inluence 
development plans and contest policies with the executive councils, 
national ministry staff, and the governorate given their lack of technical 
knowledge and relative political weakness? Real power remains in the 
hands of the central government and its local bureaucratic institutions.
Clearly, there has not been signiicant change in local politics or 
local administration at the bottom of the governmental system. The 
articles which regulate local administration promulgated in the 2012 
Constitution were very disappointing to many and largely maintained 
the highly centralized and managerial character of local administration 
from the Mubarak era. For instance, these articles do not allow citizens to 
elect their own governors or mayors. The post-revolutionary Constitutions 
did not give the Local Municipal Units more autonomy to raise their own 
funds at the local level or allow them greater control and management 
of the services usually delivered by the central level in Egypt, such as 
healthcare and education. One new positive dimension of the articles in 
the new constitution related to local government is that the minimum age 
of candidates for the local councils was lowered to 21 years of age and 
a quarter of seats are allocated to youth and another quarter to women. 
For those interested in deepening democracy in Egypt, we have 
to ask how current (and proposed) boundaries of participation and 
representation can be broadened beyond elected local councils. How 
can local initiatives shift their attention to mobilizing and building 
broader constituencies and coalitions towards these ends? Although 
often discounted in the past, civil society and local initiatives need to 
redirect their energy and demands to this level of politics and focus 
on transforming local government into capable, responsive, transparent 
and accountable entities instead of being a dumping ground or safety 
net for retired military/police personnel (see Sayigh 2012). 
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WHAT IS THE VALUE OF LOCAL INITIATIVES?
Local Initiatives Maximize Use of Local Knowledge and 
Resources
First, there are many important roles which local initiatives can play 
to promote the counter-narrative of in-situ development and devise 
localized solutions utilizing local knowledge to solve social justice 
issues instead of top-down “one-size-its-all” policies. Local initiatives 
should pressure the government to invest inancial resources where 
the majority of residents live.1 A coalition of initiatives promoting a 
new urban paradigm can be critical players in demanding a transition 
from “A City for the Few” to “A City for All.” Everyone in Cairo should 
enjoy the “right to the city” – an idea that cities belong to everyone, 
and everyone should have a say in envisioning and creating its future 
to conform to their needs and aspirations. The set of collective urban 
and environment-related rights included within the notion of the “right 
to the city” promotes the common well-being of all inhabitants and 
encourages all citizens to participate in the planning and decision-
making processes that affect their living environment.
Complementing the Role of the State: «ا اتنن ن، يشيلو ة أم ود  ”ال
(A Basket with Two Handles should be carried by Two People)
The Egyptian state is too “soft” today (administratively, inancially, 
and politically) to control urban development and it needs partners 
to complement government resources. In fact, the state has far fewer 
resources than it did before the Revolution and expectations for change 
and progress are still high. The state needs to recognize its limits, seek out 
citizen contributions and partner with them, and value the community 
assets (human, physical, social, inancial, and natural assets) of the 
entire city rather than to stigmatize the poor and informal areas and 
underestimate their internal resources, as it has been doing for decades. 
The state needs to explore and expand channels to collaborate with 
new initiatives in an institutionalized and mutually beneicial manner. 
Local Initiatives are Good for Democracy
Participatory governance can deepen democracy as we have seen 
in several global cases such as Brazil or India. Greater participation 
at the local level not only enhances claims-making on the state but 
it can be an indirect way to deepen representative democracy by 
creating a more demanding and engaged citizenry. In other words, 
participation is not only an end but a means to more representation. 
1. SIMS 2011.
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After entrenched authoritarian rule there is a great need to increase 
public deliberation and government legitimacy and the state must open 
up more “invited spaces” to non-state actors, particularly those who 
mobilized successfully to end authoritarian regimes.2 
Photo 2: A neighborhood organization called the Nahia Foundation initiated 
the Nahia Garbage Project in January, 2012. The idea for the project was an 
outcome of the upsurge in public participation and civic action that followed 
the 2011 popular uprising. The project provided much needed garbage 
collection services at a reasonable price and demonstrated the viability of 
citizen-led projects in Cairo’s informal areas. Photo Credit: TADAMUN/
Sherif Gaber.
Deepening institutionalized forms of participatory local governance 
can improve the monitoring of service provision and the eficacy of 
local development projects, while enriching deliberative democracy by 
voicing previously marginalized community’s needs. 
In India, for example, a small NGO in Rajistan – Mazdoor Kisan 
Shakti Sangathan (MKSS – Association for the Empowerment of Workers 
and Peasants) – was at the forefront of strengthening India’s Right to 
Information Law, demanding that local oficials answer their questions 
about local government budgets, projects, and absentee civil servants, 
in public meetings in their village and towns. Their use of social audits 
spread throughout the country, culminating eventually in the Right to 
2. CORNWALL 2002.
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Information Act (2005), enabling millions of citizens to have access to 
public records and government documents to hold their government 
oficials accountable and to monitor government expenditure in 
different public projects.
In many other nations which have experienced a transition from 
military and securitized rule, we argue it is instructive to look at social 
movements and initiatives who survived the transition by developing 
broader participatory institutions in dialogue and engagement with 
the state. Typically, to overcome protest exhaustion and new political 
realities in a post-revolutionary situation, citizens must switch from 
mobilizing against the power structure to engaging and cooperating 
with it, if not joining the government itself. Of course, some examples 
such as South Africa provide cautionary tales about opposition groups 
who are rapidly absorbed into the new government, leaving civil 
society severely depleted. 
In Egypt, initiatives must carefully deine their agendas and prioritize 
their solutions to social injustice – a main concern of the revolution 
in 2011. In Latin America, for example, after the defeat of military 
regimes in the 1970s and 1980s, movements to promote social justice 
in the built environment and increased democratization at the local 
level promoted new understandings of the collective or social right to 
property; they encouraged the use of cooperative housing and more 
generally politicized the discourse around urban planning to demand 
broader citizen deliberation in planning processes. They spearheaded a 
new approach to urban planning which includes a much more political 
and redistributive lens rather than a top-down management approach, 
or a technical and bureaucratic one, common in autocratic regimes.
In Latin America leftist parties and social movements shifted their 
priorities to the “local.” They promoted participatory development and 
citizen engagement, and in the process, increased their electoral power 
and popularity which, of course, was critical in the new electoral 
environment. Participatory governance promoted the devolution 
of state power to improve local municipal politics and strengthen 
new democratic actors in order to hold the new, supposedly more 
responsive government accountable. In addition, in order to address 
social justice issues and redress inequality, these initiatives focused 
on more progressive and equitable land tenure rights, the provision of 
basic services, public goods, and public spaces, and the “Right to the 
City.” Grass-roots activism was also essential to weakening clientelist 
networks, including those within the political parties which had led the 
transitions and begun resorting to “vote buying” policies in the new 
electoral climate.3
3. HELLER 2001.
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Law-Making Procedures: Via Public Mobilization
In Brazil, civil society and social movements had been unable to 
dislodge the military and security forces from power even after the 
democratic transition, yet participatory governance and participatory 
budgeting broadened their constituencies and popularity and 
strengthened their hand to ight for the further civilianization of the 
state down the road.
Democratic forces in Brazil were able to inluence a new Constitution 
which was extremely long and contained several innovative channels for 
public participation and engagement. Paradoxically, the legislature and 
the executive were still dominated by rather conservative forces from 
the military era and the Brazilian military was never held accountable 
for its human rights abuses. Yet, Article 61, (2), of the 1988 Brazilian 
Constitution allowed for citizens to propose legislation as long as “at 
least one percent of Brazilian voters, distributed throughout at least 
ive States, with no less than three tenths of one percent of the voters 
of each of these States” signed a petition. Through this participatory 
constitutional process, a coalition gathered 150,000 signatures from all 
over the country to add the Urban Reform Grassroots Amendment to the 
Constitution. The fundamental principles of this reform were the “right 
to the city,” the promotion of the “social function” of the city, urban 
land reform, as well as democratic and participative management of 
the city.4
Although few constitutions in the Middle East allow for similar 
popular initiatives, the women’s movement in Morocco and in Iran 
launched a Million Signature Campaign to Reform Personal Status Law. 
In Morocco the pressure from the campaign led to some signiicant 
reforms. In Iran, activists were less successful. The use of social media 
campaigns for activism was obviously an important part of the success 
of the Egyptian Revolution, particularly the “We Are All Khalid Sa’id” 
Facebook group. These strategies can be utilized again for mass lobbying 
and petition campaigns to demand more local participation, citizen 
engagement, and constitutional changes. Coalitions need to focus on 
broad social justice issues rather than ideological or party afiliation to 
foster social justice in the built environment and strengthen democratic 
municipal politics. 
In Brazil, after many more years of organizing and lobbying, the 
National Movement for Urban Reform and other coalitions convinced 
the government to establish the National Ministry of Cities in 2001 and 
though underfunded, it provided leadership for even more important 
policies to improve the urban environment. 
4. ZANELLI 2008.
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Participatory Budgeting and Municipal Politics: An Innovative 
Approach
Constitutional activism in Brazil went hand in hand with building 
large, diverse coalitions of groups and movements who were dedicated 
to social justice issues in urban and rural areas of the country. Some of 
those groups had been active in the ight against the military and others 
continued to promote land rights, public services, racial equality, 
indigenous rights, or a living wage. The Brazilian case provides evidence 
that a participatory approach to governance, promoted in a sequential, 
incremental process, can provide great dividends to urban populations, 
while simultaneously strengthening national democratic processes. 
The idea of participatory budgeting at the municipal level was 
pioneered in Brazil by the leftist Workers’ Party (PT) which eventually 
elected President Lula in 2002. The model has since spread across Latin 
America and the globe. The WP increased its electoral strength and 
regional presence by promoting participatory budgeting throughout the 
country, at the local municipal level, inviting citizens to join a series of 
highly organized meetings and workshops to prioritize and fund local 
needs. In Porto Alegre, Brazil in the late 1980s and 1990s, citizens took 
over many functions usually reserved for bureaucrats: setting city-wide 
spending priorities, planning investment, reviewing payrolls, not to 
mention setting the rules for the participatory budgeting process itself 
and monitoring its outcomes.
A signiicant portion of the annual municipal budget (between nine 
and twenty-one percent of the total) was decided in this way, funding 
hundreds of projects with a completion rate of nearly 100 percent. By 
2004, some 20,000 individuals in the city were attending the irst round 
of meetings, many of them for the irst time. A conservative estimate 
was that ten percent of adults in the city had at one point participated. 
Participatory budgeting fashions a “language of public responsibility and 
rights that evolves from their work together.”5 In general, participatory 
budgeting has been somewhat successful in devolving power, authority, 
and inancial autonomy to the very local level; improving local 
service provision, enhancing government responsiveness and public 
deliberation and increasing state transparency.
Of course, it is not a panacea, but by 2004 at least 200 cities had 
participatory budgeting in place, and at least half of those municipalities 
were run by a different party than the one that had launched the 
initiative. The process has not only led to tighter monitoring of public 
services and development projects because of the closer scrutiny of 
these lengthy deliberative bodies, but engaged citizens were often able 
5. ZANELLI 2008.
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to redirect more national and state resources to the local level as well. 
At the same time, there was not only a political learning curve of newly 
active citizens, but growth in the number of collective organizations 
they established, and new political blood as a new cadre of candidates 
ran for elective ofice and leadership positions after their involvement 
in participatory budgeting.
CONCLUSION: A NEW URBAN AGENDA
While Egyptian citizens may have had high hopes for change 
after 2011, many of them have found national politics disappointing 
over the past two years since these remarks were irst delivered at a 
conference in Cairo (CEDEJ). Yet, a variety of urban activists, human 
rights organizations, civil society organizations, professional architects 
and planners, as well as local initiatives rooted in communities and 
neighborhoods continue their struggle to enhance social justice and 
improve the built environment and urban development. We argue that 
an urban agenda which prioritizes the following goals, as dificult as 
they may be, is still urgently needed. 
To redistribute power and make the state more responsive and 
accountable to citizens, citizen protests and strategies should move 
away from the streets and into the corridors of power; since it is the 
state and its institutions which still need to respond to the core demands 
of the 2011 revolution. Often popular complaints are limited in scope 
to solving an immediate problem: a house doesn’t have electricity, the 
road is in terrible condition, the garbage hasn’t been collected in a 
month, or a home is condemned. These are legitimate problems, but 
require limited solutions. Rarely does a demand for adequate utility 
services escalate to demands and a long-term pragmatic strategy to 
change the nature of service delivery or the distribution of services 
throughout the city. Demands to save a community from demolition do 
not escalate into demands to insist on more deliberative, accountable, 
inclusive, and participatory urban planning in Egypt or rejecting 
predominant neoliberal economic regime. This is not, in any way, to 
suggest that Egyptians don’t have the capacity to see the connections 
between discrete problems affecting a few and the root cause or larger 
context of these problems. Instead, ministerial roles and responsibilities 
are so opaque and sometimes unclear even to government oficials 
themselves that citizens are sometimes at a loss about which Minister, 
Ministry, or parastatal to target. The government knows this and tries to 
maintain its bureaucratic interests, insulate itself from the public, and 
serve the rulers at the top, continuing their paternalistic and autocratic 
relationships with their citizens. The government’s urban strategy is 
often one of appeasement or willful ignorance to “illegal” behavior 
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that leaves citizens’ to fend for themselves or pay for private services 
themselves. Nevertheless, it is state policies and regulations which need 
transformation so that the state can serve the larger public interest.
Government planners should shift from the current technical, 
bureaucratic, and management approach to urban planning to a more 
political approach which routinely insists on public deliberation, 
review, and input. It is a common practice among planners around the 
world to eschew politics by relying exclusively on “rational” solutions 
derived from statistics, measurements, and models. Involving citizens 
in the planning process can be dificult and more complicated for them. 
This is not to suggest that there is no place in planning for the rational 
approach – data is powerful and the Egyptian government should do all 
they can to improve their data collection efforts – but a vision for a city 
or neighborhood that derives from the people who live there will not 
only be more democratic, but will likely be more successful.
Government policy should also be radically redirected to strengthen 
in situ development and recognize the assets of diverse communities, 
including informal housing areas. The Egyptian government has spent 
billions of Egyptian pounds building dozens of new cities over the past 
several decades and as part of the National Strategic Plan for urban 
development, plans to build 44 additional cities by 2052. While in 
theory, building new cities may help alleviate some of the development 
pressures on Egypt’s densest urban areas, in practice, existing urban 
areas do not receive the attention and investment they require to 
maintain their vitality and the new city projects always fall short of 
their projected goals.
In order to achieve some of these new policies, citizens need to build 
cross-cutting coalitions around social justice issues to demand change 
that will beneit the general public rather than an exclusive segment of 
the population. Social movements around the world have demonstrated 
the effectiveness of coalitions and activist networks. There are hundreds 
of organizations working in Egypt on a multitude of social justice 
issues, from human rights to environmental sustainability. Yet building 
stronger coalitions around common issues has been more elusive. For 
example, the right to information is an issue that a large majority of 
the population, including environmentalists, the media, historians, and 
public health activists can support. Yet, minority elite deny Egyptians 
the right to information in “the public interest.” Another example is 
public transportation. Investment in public transportation stands to 
beneit both commuters and businesses, increase accessibility of public 
services to a greater proportion of the population, help integrate peri-
urban areas of Cairo more tightly into the regional economy, alleviate 
trafic congestion, reduce pollution, and bolster the value of real-
estate. Instead a greater proportion of the state transportation budget 
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is invested in highways which stand to beneit private car owners 
– a distinct minority in Egypt. These are just two examples of social 
justice issues around which organizations might collaborate, but the 
possibilities are endless.
Given the challenge of changing the government bureaucracy or 
policymaking, coalitions must be as broad as possible and enlist a range 
of civil society groups, the professional class, the labor movement, 
residents groups, industrialists, and businesspersons, artists, actors, 
the media, and reformist, “internal allies” within the government to 
succeed.
Much of the instability in Egypt’s urban areas stems from the fact 
that people do not have the political space to express their needs to the 
government. Without this space, citizens take to the streets in protest. 
Despite recent skepticism over electoral democracy, the repressive turn 
since the summer of 2013, and the re-assertion of the armed forces in 
Egyptian politics, Egypt still needs a working, representative legislature 
and the deepening of democracy. One way to open these channels of 
communication between citizens and the government is to reform local 
government to provide more democratic power for elected councils, 
broaden their responsibilities and autonomy, and ensure that public 
resources are shared at all levels of government, not only the central 
one in Cairo. It may be true that many local government oficials do 
not have the technical or administrative skills to govern effectively and 
there will be considerable debate about devolving responsibilities to 
the local level in Egypt. Thus, any reform efforts must be accompanied 
by a serious and sustained commitment from oficials at the highest 
level of government in the form of a government capacity building 
program to train local oficials. Without democratization of what is 
now called “local administration” Egyptians will not have the tools and 
rights to solve their problems locally and deliberate about their future. 
Given the remarkable ability of Egyptians to mobilize around political 
claims, the true risk is not in reform, but in maintaining the status quo.
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